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I. INTRODUCTION
Indisputably, childhood sexual abuse is one of the most heinous
crimes that can be committed against another human being. This is
accentuated by the fact that a blood relationship exists between the vic-
timizer and the victim. This form of sexual abuse is not only penalized
in the criminal codes of every nation, but it also receives universal reli-
gious condemnation.'
Three recurrent themes exist in all cases of childhood sexual abuse:
(1) the victim's extreme vulnerability due to the personal relationship
with the victimizer (parents against children, adults against minors,
tutors against pupils, clergy against flock, etc.); (2) the devastating,
everlasting and traumatic effects on the victim; and (3) the failure to
report the incident(s) to authorities because of incapacity, fear and
embarrassment.
Cases of childhood sexual abuse are, even today, rarely reported. The
secrecy of the act is not only founded in the above themes, but also
may be found in the reluctance of families and society to confront this
issue. Recently, a revolution in childhood sexual abuse awareness has
emerged due to a barrage of media exposure combined with an extraor-
dinary number of celebrities publicly speaking about and denouncing
childhood sexual abuse. With the veil of secrecy pierced, the gates have
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati, College of Law. J.D. University of
Havana, M.L.S. Kansas State Teachers College, B.A. Havana Institute.
** B.A. Ashland University, J.D. University of Cincinnati, College of Law, Member
of the Ohio Bar.
1. Catholics, Jews and Muslims alike, as well as primitive societies, have ad-
dressed the issue of incest taboo. See 7 NEw CATHOuC ENCYCLOPEDIA 419-21 (1967); 8
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1316-18 (1971).
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been opened to a flood of exposures, most apparent on radio and tele-
vision talk shows, and a proliferation of criminal and civil complaints
based on childhood sexual abuse.
As a result, decades-old acts of childhood sexual abuse have been
brought to life in courtrooms nationwide. Some of the victims have
clear, vivid memories of sexual abuses, but have remained silent over
the years, never reporting the abuses ("Type I" Complainants). Others,
through modern psychology and because of the exposures, have pro-
ceeded with litigation premised on supposedly "repressed" memories of
sexual abuse, not "actual," vivid memories ("Type II" Complainants).
These litigants claim to have selectively forgotten the alleged events
associated with the trauma, only to remember them years or decades
later. In these Type II cases, the suppressed memory of abuse usually
awakens from its slumber deep within the person's mind by the work
of a professional purportedly trained in the "recovery" of such memo-
ries.' Alternatively, a victim may be alerted to the memory by an event
reminiscent of the trauma, which reminds the person of the abuse.'
The courageous determination of abuse victims with actual, vivid
memories creates an auspicious climate for the prevention and eradica-
tion of childhood sexual abuse. The situation is different, however, for
complainants with "recovered" memories of abuse.
Recovered memory therapy is fraught with dangers that include,
among others, inducing the subject to "remember" events that never
occurred. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the creation of
a "false memory." These false memories of childhood sexual abuse have
destroyed families and reputations, and have created a credibility cri-
sis-a backlash against mental-health practitioners and crusaders
against childhood sexual abuse by people who do not know whether to
believe a particular abuse occurred.
For several years, federal and state courts nationwide have grappled
with a glut of sexual abuse cases brought by "adult children" Type II
claimants against their aged parents.4 Critics of recovered memory
2. "Recovered memory" therapy is a technique used to "unearth" long-repressed
memories of abuse. See Richard Ofshe & Ethan Watters, Making Mon-
sters-Psychotherapy's New Error: Repressed Memory, Multiple Personality and Sa-
tanic Abuse, SOCIETY, Mar. 1993, at 4, 4. Therapists believe that repression is a "pow-
erful psychological defense that causes one to lose all awareness of physically or
sexually terrifying events." Id.
3. Id.
4. As of April 17, 1993, there were 89 pending United States repressed memory
cases in which plaintiffs claimed sexual abuse. False Memory Syndrome Foundation
(FMSF), Summary of Legal Survey Data from the False Memory Syndrome Founda-
tion 7 (Apr. 17, 1993). Throughout the states, there were 199 documented cases
where victims made a formal threat to pursue legal action against the accused. Id.
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therapy attribute this flood of Type II sexual abuse litigation to the
controversial book Courage to Heal as well as to recovered memory
theory and its proponents.'
In addition to the frequency of recovered memory litigation, these
cases present pervasive procedural problems for courts nationwide.
First, an ongoing debate rages in the American psychological, psychiat-
ric, and medical communities regarding the validity of repressed memo-
ry syndrome and recovered memory therapy.' Recovered memory ther-
Nearly one-fifth of the persons threatened received a letter demanding money to
avoid a lawsuit. Id. In addition, over 3050 persons had been accused of Type II sexu-
al abuse as of March 24, 1993. Id. The number of accusations has grown to include
over 11,000 families nationwide as of April 10, 1994. FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME FOUN-
DATION NEWSLETTER, Mar. 8, 1994, at 1, 1.
5. ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SUR-
VFVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (3d ed. 1994). This book, which first edition appeared
in 1988, is described as the bible of the incest survivor movement. Id. The book is
often criticized for encouraging "revenge, anger, fantasies of murder or castration,
lawsuits and deathbed confrontations." See Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Re-
pressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 525 (1993) (citing H. Wafefield & R.
Underwager, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: Lawsuits Against Parents,
10 BEHAVIORAL SCi. & L. 483, 485 (1992)). In reaction to this influential book, four
new works appeared in 1994 challenging it: (1) ELIZABETH LOFrUS & KATHERINE
KETCHEM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF
SEXUAL ABUSE (1994) (presenting in layman's prose the fruits of the authors' research
from thousands of books, articles, and letters, as well as hundreds of interviews with
accusers and accuseds, lawyers, therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, criminologists,
etc.); (2) RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WATrERS, MAKING MONSTERS, FALSE MEMORIES, PSY-
CHOTHERAPY AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA (1996) (criticizing sexual abuse from Sigmund
Freud's times to current events); (3) LENORE TERRE, UNCHAINED MEMORIES: TRUE STO-
RIES OF TRAUMATIC MEMORIES, LOST AND FOUND (1994) (describing her own and
others' experiences as child psychiatrists dealing with cases of recovered memories
and child sexual abuse); (4) LAWRENCE J. WRIGHT, REMEMBERING SATAN: A CASE OF
RECOVERED MEMORY AND THE SHATTERING OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY (1994) (presenting a
vivid, detailed account of the tribulations of a father falsely accused of sexually
abusing two of his daughters). Most recently, a father falsely accused of sexual abuse
by his two adult daughters published a well-researched and compassionate treatment
of the subject. MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY: INCEST ACCUSATIONS AND
SHATTERED LIVES (1995). His book has been called "the long-awaited rebuttal to The
Courage to Heal." See id. (inside jacket cover). For an extensive description and
review of all the above-mentioned books, see Frederick Crews, The Revenge of the
Repressed (pts. 1 & 2), N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 17, 1994, at 54, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec.
1, 1994, at 49.
6. See Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45
VAND. L REV. 1185, 1202-05 (1992) (discussing the use of memory retrieval in litiga-
tion); Elizabeth F. Loftus, You Must Remember This . . . Or Do You? How Real Are
apy critics cite the lack of any scientific evidence that validates the re-
coverability of repressed memories.7 Richard Ofshe has written:
The substantive controversy turns on the validity of the concept of repression, the
central mechanism of the theory .... If repression is a valid concept, clients
could be recovering long hidden memories of abuse. If invalid, repression is noth-
ing more than a pseudo-scientific smoke screen for treatment techniques that
create false memories .... [Tihe existence of repression has never been empiri-
cally demonstrated. Sixty years of experiments... have failed to produce any
evidence of its existence!
The American Medical Association (AMA), American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation (APA) and American Psychological Association have all cautioned
against the use and acceptance of recovered memory therapy. The AMA
issued a position statement on recovered memory therapy, stating: "'The
AMA considers recovered memories, the technique of discovering child-
hood sexual abuse to be of uncertain authenticity, which should be sub-
ject to external verification. The use of recovered memories is fraught
with problems of potential misapplications.'"9 They also recognized that
most controversial are those memories that surface only in therapy and
those from either infancy or late childhood, including adolescence."0
Similarly, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, on December 12, 1993, stated its position on recovered memories as
follows:
'It is not known how to distinguish, with complete accuracy, memories based on
true events from those derived from other sources'.... [C]hild sexual abuse is a
'risk factor for many classes of psychiatric disorders'... and ... the coping
mechanisms 'can result in a lack of conscious awareness of the abuse .... Con-
scious thoughts and feelings stemming from the abuse may emerge at a later
date.'... 'There is no completely accurate way of determining the validity of
reports (of sexual abuse) in the absence of corroborating information.'... 'The
retrieval and recounting of a memory can modify the form of the memory, which
may influence the content and the conviction about the veracity of the memory in
the future.'... 'Memories can be significantly influenced by questioning... and it
has also been shown that repeated questioning may lead individuals to report
"memories" of events that never occurred."'
Repressed Memories?, WASH. POST, June 23, 1993, at Cl (discussing validity of re-
pressed memories); Jim Browning, Recalling Abuse: 'False Memory Syndrome' Is Lit-
tle More Than an Excuse for Denying Sexual Trauma, VANCOUVER SUN, May 27,
1993, at A13 (discussing the recall of sexual abuse); Ofshe & Watters, supra note 2,
at 4 (presenting the definitive account of the reality of recovered memories).
7. Elizabeth F. Loftus, supra note 5, at 525-26.
8. Ofshe & Watters, supra note 2, at 5.
9. Id. (quoting the AMA).
10. Id. at 4.
11. Tom Genoni, Jr., 18 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER 342 (Summer 1994) (quoting from the
statement of the American Psychiatric Association).
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In its statement, the APA also addresses the question of impartiality, by
calling its members to maintain an "emphatic, nonjudgmental, neutral"
stance towards reported memories of sexual abuse. 2 It also addresses
competence, by warning that therapists without proper training in many
areas of care may cause further psychiatric problems for a patient.3
Moreover, a conference organized by the American Association of Sex
Educators, Counselors and Therapists (AASECT) addressed memories of
sexual abuse, where the AASECT president stated that therapists "should
police [them]selves and train [themiselves to become part of the solu-
tion, rather than being part of the problem, which we currently really
are."
14
Despite this controversy in repressed memory theory's native fields,
many courts and legislatures accept the theory of memory repression as
if it were the law of gravity.' Courts often leave the scientific decision
of whether recovered memories can or did occur to a scientifically uned-
ucated jury. Such a jury must rely on information given by experts in
professions typically opposed to such memories. These courts have all
but accepted without speculation the concept of repressed memory.
Additionally, these courts have disregarded state statutes of limitations,
using a discovery rule exception or other legal theory to permit an adult
to sue an alleged perpetrator years after the alleged abuse.
Strong political currents are often at the base of the problem. The
United States has become a victim-oriented society. 6 A "culturally sensi-
tive" movement has forged new paths in the law. 7 Sexual abuse too has
12. Id. at 342.
13. Id. at 343.
14. See Rick McDonough, Professor Sees Shift Toward Skepticism About Recovered
Memories, THE COURIER J., May 15, 1994, at B9.
15. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
16. Dr. Fred Frankel, Professor of Psychology at Harvard Medical School, com-
menting on politically correct feminists and sexual abuse, said, "It's part of the femi-
nist victim-ology theory .... [Tlhe notion of repression meshes very well with the
perspective that women are major victims of abuse by men." Sharon Churcher, The
Feminist Police Tearing Fathers and Daughters Apart, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Nov. 28,
1993, at 37.
17. According to Charles Krauthhammer, the Lorena Bobbitt and Menendez
brothers' trials are indicative of how society has warmed to claims of sexual abuse.
See Charles Krauthhammer, Everybody Claims to be the Victim, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Feb. 7, 1994, at A10. In each case, the defendants admitted the alleged maiming or
murders, but were not found guilty because of-at least in part-the novel defense of
sexual abuse. Id. In the case of Susan Smith, who confessed to the murder of her
two children, perhaps the key element in determining her sentence of life in prison
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become starkly political.'8 To question the issue of alleged childhood
sexual abuse, real or imagined, is to trudge upon a politically correct
mine field.'9
This phenomenon is not strange to American society. Two hundred
years ago in Salem, Massachusetts, innocents were accused, tried, and
convicted of being "witches" based on social mores and then-existing re-
ligious and political zealotry.20 The child accusers complained of spec-
ters,2' in the form of the accused, descending upon them at night, tor-
turing and molesting them.22 The innocents were imprisoned, tried, con-
victed, sent to Witches' Hill, and then hung.23 Convictions were based
only upon uncorroborated2 verbal accusation-no different from the re-
covered memory testimony of today.25
instead of capital punishment was the fact, aired at the sentencing hearing, that her
step-father sexually abused her in her teen years. See Jack Hitts, Susan Smith's
Judgment Day; A Liberal Asks Whose Guilt Would be Extinguished by her Death,
WASH. POST, June 25, 1995, at C05.
18. Another commentator noted that civil sexual abuse lawsuits enable "[i]ncest
survivors, without having to rely on a district attorney to respond, to call both perpe-
trators and society to account for the harm caused by this all too prevalent practice
rooted in patriarchal domination." Ofshe & Watters, supra note 2, at 5; see also
Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575,
585 (1993) (discussing a mass tort model to illustrate the harm of incest). Further, at
the New York Radical Feminist Conference, social worker Florence Rush stated,
Sexual abuse of children is permitted because it is an unspoken, but promi-
nent factor in socializing and preparing the female to accept a subordinate
role: to feel guilty, ashamed, and then to tolerate, through fear, the power
exercised over her by men .... [T~he females early sexual experiences
prepare her to submit later in life to adult forms of sexual abuse heaped on
her by her boyfriend, her lover, her husband. In short, the sexual abuse of
female children is a process of education that prepares them to become the
wives and mothers of America.
ELEANOR GOLDSTEIN & KEVIN FARMER, TRUE STORIES OF FALSE MEMORIES 169-70 (1993).
19. See Ofshe & Watters, supra note 2, at 5.
20. PAUL BOYER & STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, SALEM POSSESSED: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
WIrcHcRAFT 181-85 (1974).
21. Specters were intangible spirits purportedly assuming the shape of the accused
and committing the criminal acts. Id. at 11, 16. The actual crime was in the compact
between the witch and the devil, the former permitting the latter to assume his or
her human form or perform certain acts. Id. at 11. Proving these private and secret
transactions was exceptionally difficult. Id.
22. See generally KENNETH SILVERMAN, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF COTTON MATHER
(1982).
23. BOYER & NISSENBAUM, supra note 20, at 7-9.
24. Physicians subjected the accused to "exhaustive and conscientious" bodily ex-
aminations in search of evidence of guilt of witchcraft. Id. at 13.
25. No evidence, of course, existed manifesting the guilt of the accused witch. Id.
at 11, 15. "For although witchcraft was indisputably a crime according to ... the
statutes of Massachusetts, it was . . . the most maddening and frustrating crime imag-
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The Salem witch trials ended only after the Massachusetts legislature
passed a bill that forbade the use of spectral evidence alone as proof of
guilt.26 The evil that gripped Salem Village in the late seventeenth centu-
ry seems incomprehensible to us today. The events during those years,
although true, are a forgotten footnote in American history, but truth
nonetheless." Over the years, this nation has, at times, unwittingly re-
visited Salem. Examples are the Red Scare of the 1920s,28 Japanese in-
ternment camps of the 1940s,' the McCarthy era of the 1950s,' Alien
and Sedition Acts,3 the anti-Masonic hysteria during the 1820s and early
1830s,1 2 the persecution of Mormons during the 1840s and 1850s,' and
the repression of anarchists after the haymarket Riot of 1886.' Unfortu-
nately, the hallmark of a "witch hunt" is the fact that it is only after inno-
cents are persecuted that reasonable minds understand it as such.
With the onslaught of recovered memory cases, this nation may be
descending into yet another witch hunt. This one is more analogous to
Salem than any in its interim; parents, priests, and neighbors are being
accused of such heinous crimes as ritualistic abuse, fetal sacrifice, mur-
der, animal sacrifice, and sexual molestation.' Like the Salem Village
experience, it is the word of the accuser alone, sometimes "verified" by a
therapist, that supports the accuser's "spectral" memories of the crime.36
inable . . . because the evil deeds on which the indictments rested were not physical-
ly perpetrated by the witches . . . . but by intangible spirits who could at times as-
sume their shape." Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 20.
27. See generally CHARLES UPHAM, SALEM WITCHCRAFT (1971).
28. See generally DON E. CARLETON, RED SCARE! (1985).
29. See generally ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS
(1993).
30. See generally RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE McCARTHY ERA IN
PERSPECTIVE (1990).
31. See generally JAMES M. SMITH, FREEDOM FETTERS (1966).
32. AuCIA FELT TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT 351-58 (1944).
33. LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE 44-64 (1979).
34. JOHN ARTHUR GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH 166-70 (1968). One author
referred to these periods as "pathological periods" in American history. Vincent Blasi,
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L REV. 449, 450-
51 n.2 (1985).
35. See Kenneth V. Lanning, INVESTIGATOR'S GUIDE TO ALLEGATIONS OF "RITUAL"
CHILD ABUSE, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, Jan. 1992. See generally Ofshe
& Watters, supra note 2.
36. See generally Gary M. Ermsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories
Lie? Words of Caution about Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 128 (1993) (discussing the controversy sur-
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This Article will concern itself with the propriety of altering statutes of
limitations to permit filing recovered memory lawsuits, in light of tradi-
tional statute of limitations jurisprudence. Accordingly, the authors sug-
gest that it is time to return to traditional statute of limitations jurispru-
dence, having seen the damage done by ignoring the limitations period.
Part II explores the current controversy between the medical profession,
the legislatures, and the courts over recovered memory theory." Part III
examines the traditional role that statutes of limitations have occupied in
American jurisprudence and the judicially created "discovery rule" excep-
tion.' Part IV surveys sexual abuse cases involving "repressed memo-
ries" of sexual abuse, and cases in which the plaintiff failed to under-
stand the causal relationship between known sexual abuse and latent
psychological harm. 9 Part V examines alternative avenues of relief for
adults who are falsely accused of sexually abusing children.4"
II. THE CONTROVERSY: THE SCIENTISTS, THE LEGISLATURES,
AND THE COURTS
When a person possessing recovered memories of sexual abuse de-
cides to file a lawsuit, "psycho-science" and the law collide. The result is
analogous to forcing a square peg into a round hole. The law is com-
pelled to accommodate decades-old abuse claims that undoubtedly
would have been weeded out by statutes of limitations in earlier days.
Meanwhile, the psychological and psychiatric communities must bring
their own inexact science to the bar to explain the debate over recov-
ered memories to a culturally sensitive jury. Even more troubling is that
in Type II cases, no judicial, psychological or psychiatric mechanism
exists to distinguish false claims of sexual abuse from those that are
true." Some commentators and courts have suggested that some form
of corroborative proof of the abuse is necessary to proceed in court
under a repressed memory theory when the traditional statute of limita-
tions has expired. Proponents of repressed memory theory argue that
rounding memory repression).
37. See infra notes 41-53.
38. See irfra notes 54-85.
39. See infra notes 86-187.
40. See infra notes 188-213.
41. Seymour Halleck, The Use of Psychiatric Diagnoses in the Legal Process; Task
Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association, 20 BuLL. AM. ACAD. OF PSY-
CHIATRY AND L. 481, 495 (1992). Many former accusers have already retracted their
accusations by saying that the repressed memories were either false, or the product
of a memory implanted or created by an unscrupulous therapist. See generally Tom
McNamee, When Memory Lies: Bernardin Case Heightens Debate over Repression,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at 1 (discussing the collapse of a well-known abuse
case and the resulting skepticism surrounding repressed memory evidence).
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requiring proof of the act, which may have occurred some twenty years
earlier, is unreasonable, and a majority of courts agree." For example, a
Michigan appellate court rejected outright the notion that proof of abuse
was a threshold barrier to pursuing a recovered memory claim.' Thus,
unlike traditional judicial mechanisms used to weed out meritless claims,
repressed memory plaintiffs are more than likely guaranteed a trial or a
lucrative settlement."
However, unlike "psycho-scientifically" questionable recovered memo-
ries, scientific evidence exists demonstrating that false memories can be
created. Jean Piaget once said of memory, "Suggestion is a potent dis-
42. BAss & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 22. The book's readers are told: "You may
think you don't have memories, but often as you begin to talk about what you do
remember, there emerges a constellation of feelings, reactions and recollections that
add up to substantial information. To say 'I was abused,' you don't need the kind of
recall that would stand up in the court of law." Id.
43. See Lemmerman v. Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 449
Mich. 56 (1995) (expressly rejecting corroborative evidence requirement for sexual
abuse claim); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994) (refusing to require inde-
pendent corroborative evidence of sexual abuse). A growing number of courts, how-
ever, are requiring plaintiffs to present corroborative evidence to support and substan-
tiate the otherwise naked allegation of abuse. See Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d
606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); see also Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993).
44. For example, one plaintiff sued her father alleging that he sexually abused her
during 1964. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, Case No. 293313 (Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, complaint filed on Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with the author). The plaintiff alleged
she "repressed" her memory of the abuse until entering psychotherapy in "early
1989." Id. The plaintiff successfully defended the defendant's motion to dismiss on
grounds that (1) the four-year statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim was tolled until plaintiff discovered the abuse in early 1989 (giv-
ing her until "early 1992" to file her claim); and (2) plaintiff had "repressed" all mem-
ory of the events until "early 1989." Id. After discovery, it was clear that plaintiff had
recalled the incidents of abuse in September 1988, placing her outside the limitations
period for sexual abuse. Id. Plaintiff then, however, successfully defeated defendant's
motion for summary judgment by arguing that while the abuse was discovered in
September 1988, the revelation rendered her mentally incompetent to file her claim in
a timely manner. Id. Neither the complaint nor plaintiffs briefs were verified by an
affidavit. Id. In short, the court permitted the plaintiff to present her own uncorrobo-
rated facts to circumvent and avoid the statute of limitations defense. Id. The court
dismissed the plaintiffs case without prejudice, leaving her one year from the date of
dismissal to refile the complaint. Id.
45. See Harold 1. Lief, Psychiatry's New Challenge: Defining an Appropriate Ther-
apeutic Role When Child Abuse is Suspected, PSYCIATRIc NEWS, Aug. 21, 1992
("There has been a recent increase in the number of 'therapists' who encourage peo-
ple to 'remember' events that never happened and to accuse parents falsely, often
decades after the alleged events took place .... In seeking to expose abuses, mis-
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ruption of the truth," and suggestion seems to be the culprit in cases of
recovered memories.46 While ethical norms have deterred scientists
from implanting false memories of sexual abuse, nearly every other mem-
ory has been shown capable of being implanted into a subject's mind.
The subject thereafter believes the implanted, but false memory, to be
true. 7
Given the undisputed fact that no evidence exists to support repressed
memory theory,41 courts should be hesitant to entertain repressed mem-
ory cases. Courts have not been hesitant, however, and plaintiffs con-
tinue to file sexual abuse claims based on questionable psycho-scientific
theory at an alarming rate.49 Commentators across the country have
concluded that a new witch hunt is under way in America. This time the
hunt targets America's aged parents, who often lack the drive and fmanc-
es to rebut allegations of sexual abuse that may be twenty or more years
old.50
guided therapists in many cases help invent them."); Elizabeth F. Loftus, You Must
Remember This ..... .Or Do You? How Real Are Repressed Memories? WASH.
POST, June 27, 1993, at Cl, C2 (illustrating the "post-event information often becoming
incorporated into memory, supplementing and altering a person's recollection").
46. Anastasia Toufexis, When Can Memories Be Trusted, TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at 86.
Piaget wrote that for years he recounted the memory of how his nurse foiled an
attempt to kidnap him at age two from his carriage. Id. Years later, the retired nurse
admitted she had fabricated the story to impress her employers. Id. Piaget had heard
the story so often that he not only remembered the event, but created his own mem-
ory of the events that supposedly took place the day of his "kidnapping." Id.
47. Loftus, supra note 45, at Cl.
48. This is true in light of the growing number of former psychotherapy patients
who have retracted earlier accusations of child sexual or ritual abuse, saying over-
zealous therapists implanted and caused the false memory. See Joe Dirck, True Mem-
ory or Another Abuse, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 14, 1993, at IB; Ambrose Evans-
Pritchard, Feverish Epidemic of Sex Abuse Therapy, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at
A17 (comparing recovered memories of past abuse to "voodoo"); Anne Mullens, Wom-
an Knows She Erred in Accusing Mother of Abuse, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 26, 1992,
at All; Betsy Rubiner, Women Retract Allegations of Abuse, DES MOINES REGISTER,
Nov. 21, 1993, at 3 ("people who retract allegations of childhood abuse they say were
falsely incubated by ill-trained therapists"); Mark Smith, Haunted Dreams: Real or
Implanted?/Woman Says Therapy Begat Visions, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 12, 1993, at Al
(discussing suit against therapists for implanting false memories).
49. Because of the flood of litigation resulting from Illinois' blanket discovery rule
permitting "repressed memory" lawsuits and the recent events surrounding Cardinal
Joseph Bernardin, see infra notes 51-52, Illinois amended its statute of limitations,
opting for a statute of repose, which cut off claims discovered by the adult-child
survivor after reaching age 35. Illinois Considers Limit on Sex Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1994, § 1, at 25. However, the statute was almost immediately superseded.
See infra note 56.
50. "What's happening maybe [sic] a new kind of psychological witch hunt against
which the accused has no good defense." Joan Beck, Memory of Abuse, True or Not,
Means Pain for All Involved, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1993, at 31; see also John Taylor,
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Repressed memory cases present another problem. Do those falsely
accused of sexual abuse have any recourse against the accuser, or the
therapist as a third party, for suing upon the implanted or false memo-
ry?5 An allegation of sexual abuse is powerful and potentially devastat-
ing. Such accusations should be asserted only after serious, thorough
consideration of all events and circumstances. Allowing individuals, such
as Steven Cook in the case of Cardinal Bemardin,52 to make baseless
accusations is dangerous and destructive. The reputations of both the ac-
cused and those who truly have been abused and who remember the
abuse vividly without the aid of a therapist will be hurt by false accusa-
tions. It is an invitation to revisit Salem Village.'
It is too late to stem the tide of state courts and legislatures rapidly
adopting procedural rules allowing repressed memory lawsuits. The word
is out, however, the public is skeptical, and the professional communities
have severely undermined the believability of recovered memory therapy
through their own cautious and skeptical position statements. It is the
courts that must now catch up to the truth. In fact, some courts have
begun adjudicating cases in which the former accusers or accuseds are
suing professionals for planting or inducing recovered memories.
The Lost Daughter; How one American family got caught up in today's witches'
brew of sexual abuse, the Sybil syndrome, and the perverse ministrations of the
therapy police, ESQUIRE, Mar. 1994, at 76. "Every society, regardless of how techno-
logically advanced and culturally sophisticated, is susceptible to mass hysteria." Id. at
80.
51. In 1994, Steven Cook charged that members of the Catholic Church, including
the esteemed Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, sexually abused him. See Howard Wilkinson,
Bernardin Out of Sex Suit, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 1, 1994, at Al. The abuse
memories were allegedly repressed and then uncovered in therapy. Id. The victim
recounted, in graphic detail, how Cardinal Bernardin had forced him to submit to
anal intercourse and to other perverse, imaginative acts. Id. Cook then retracted the
allegations, saying they were false and unreliable. Id. Cook said, "Since I cannot be
sure my memories of abuse by the Cardinal are accurate, I cannot proceed in good
conscience." Id.
52. See supra note 51.
53. The Salem Village witch hunt ended when Minister Cotton Mather convinced
the Massachusetts legislature that only "empirically verifiable and logically relevant"
evidence should be admissible at trial. BOYER & NISSENBAUM, supra note 20, at 11.
Mather stated, "It were better that ten suspected witches escape, than one innocent
person should be condemned." Id. at 10 (quoting COTTON MATHER, CASES OF CON-
SCIOUS CONCERNING EVIL SPIRITS PERSONATING MEN 66 (1693)).
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III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DIScOvERY RULE EXCEPTION
Almost every state permitting an adult survivor of childhood sexual
abuse to sue the alleged perpetrator decades after the abuse has done so
through modification of the statute of limitations. At least twenty-four
state legislatures have amended their statutes of limitations or imple-
mented a statute of repose to permit victims having repressed memories
of sexual abuse to sue decades after the alleged event.' One federal dis-
trict court and nine states have refused to toll the statute of limitations
for "victims" claiming to have repressed all memory of the sexual abuse
or claiming to have an inability to comprehend the causal relationship
between known sexual abuse and latent psychological problems."5 At
least one state, Illinois, has tried to repeal its previously approved ex-
tension of this type of statute.!" It is necessary to examine statute of
54. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.14(b)(1) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130(a)
(Michie 1993); CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.1(a) (Deering 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
577 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 13-202.2 (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE § 614.8A (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
523 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.5851 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541-073 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.046 (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216(1) (1993); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 11.215 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24-6113-1(5)(c) (West 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 95(b) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-25 (1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 560 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-249 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340(B)(2) (West Supp.
1996); Wis. STAT. § 893.587 (1992).
55. See Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 296-97 (Ky. Ct. App.
1993); Bowser v. Guttendorf, 541 A.2d 377, 379-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (due to ab-
sence of statutory 'delayed discovery,' equitable tolling would have been only possibil-
ity); see also Farris v. Compton, 802 F. Supp. 487 (D.C. 1992); Cassidy v. Smith, 817
P.2d 555 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), dismissed by 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1990) (by action of statute, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West Supp. 1992)); ABC & XYZ v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and
Minneapolis, 513 N.W.2d 482, 486-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), superseded by statute,
MINN. STAT. § 541.073(2)(a) (1992); Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1991); Doe v. Doe, 1994 WL 79555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), rev'd by Doe v.
Doe, 639 N.E.2d 432 (Ohio 1994); Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 629 N.E.2d
402, 408-09 (Ohio 1994); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 630 (Okla 1992); Seto v.
Willits, 638 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 229-30
(Wash. 1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340(1) (1991). But see
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713, 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (questioning
Burpee's reasoning that repressed memory does not constitute mental incapacity un-
der New York discovery statute, remanding case to determine if plaintiffs repressed
memories were sufficient to qualify under mental capacity tolling exception).
56. The Illinois legislature has tried to roll back the extension by introducing a bill
in its Senate that would reinstate the 35-year limitation. See Illinois Considers Limit
on Sex Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at A25. State Senator Ed Petka stated that
rolling back the previously unlimited time period was a direct response to the Cardi-
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limitations theory in order to understand the dangers encountered by
altering statute of limitations periods to permit delayed filing of recov-
ered memory lawsuits.
A. Policy Considerations Underlying Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are used to deny a "plaintiff relief if sufficient
time has elapsed between the accrual of the right of action (the event)
and commencement of the [law] suit." ' Limitations periods are usually
legislative enactments that will destroy a remedy or right of action unless
it is enforced within the time prescribed by the particular statute.' Stat-
utes of limitations have been described as both "reasonable and arbi-
trary," seeking to achieve finality for defendants while protecting courts
from stale or fraudulent claims.5
Statutes of limitations preserve judicial integrity and are fundamental
to the concept of a well-ordered judicial system.' Their existence has
been traced as far back as 1623."' Furthermore, in 1879 the United
States Supreme Court stated:
Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law.
They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They
promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. An important
public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity and punish negli-
gence.'
Despite the potential for unfairness to certain plaintiffs, and despite
the arbitrary nature by which the time limit cuts off claims, statutes of
nal Bernardin case, see supra note 51, which demonstrated a need to protect people
from lawsuits based on psychological quackery. Id. The State Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee voted 6 to 2 to advance the bill. Id. The Senate passed the bill but it was
later defeated in the House. Telephone interview with Ed Petka, Illinois State Senator
(Oct. 6, 1995).
57. Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Com-
mon Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 1011, 1014-15 (1980).
58. Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limitation and the Discovery Rule in Latent
Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Prir. L REV. 501, 512-13 (1982).
59. Nancy F. Meloy, Statutes of Limitations in Product Liability Actions: The
Discovery Rule of Franzen v. Deere & Co., 69 IOWA L. REV. 1127, 1127-28 (1984).
60. Id.
61. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 971 (1988) (citing England's Limitations Act
of 1623 as the first enacted statute of limitations).
62. Wood v. Carpemer, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
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limitations have survived for centuries because of the important policy
purposes they serve.
As Justice Holmes stated, limitations periods are "designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared."' In short, statutes of limita-
tions seek to protect courts, juries, and defendants from problems inher-
ent in the prosecution of "ancient" claims.'
For courts and juries, statutes of limitations seek to bar litigation of
stale claims.65 Statutes of limitations encourage the prompt prosecution
of claims, thereby eliminating the threat that courts and juries will have
to wade through a complex chain of causation that neither may be com-
petent to determine.w Furthermore, the limitations period ensures that
questions of fact will be decided on the basis of fresh evidence, thereby
increasing the likelihood that both courts and juries will resolve factual
issues fairly and accurately. 7
For defendants, statutes of limitations provide protection against hav-
ing to litigate claims that may have arisen decades before.' Stale claims
make it difficult for defendants to present a viable defense, as witnesses
may be dead, alibis hard to verify, and physical evidence lost.' It is se-
curity against the distant threat of liability that is of paramount impor-
tance for the defendant because statutes of limitations allow the defen-
dant to rely on known liabilities in planning future economic activity."
63. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944). In O'Stricker v. Jim Waiter Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1983), the
Ohio Supreme Court stated, "The rationale underlying statutes of limitations is four-
fold: to ensure fairness to a defendant; to encourage prompt prosecution of causes of
actions; to suppress stale and fraudulent claims; and to avoid the inconvenience en-
gendered by delay, specifically the difficulties of proof present in older cases." Id. at
731.
64. Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L REV. 1177,
1185 (1950) (hereinafter Developments).
65. See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227 (Wash. 1986). "A number of evidentiary
problems arise from stale claims," including the loss of live witnesses, physical evi-
dence, and "the [fact that] evidence which is available becomes less trustworthy as
witnesses' memories fade or are colored by intervening events and experiences." Id.
at 227-28.
66. Developments, supra note 64, at 1185-86.
67. See Tyson, 727 P.2d at 228. "Old claims are more likely to be spurious than
new ones. 'With the passing of time, minor grievances may fade away, but they may
grow to outlandish proportions too.'" Id. (citing Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 665
(Wash. 1969)).
68. Meloy, supra note 59, at 1127.
69. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 227-28.
70. Meloy, supra note 59, at 1127. "[T]here should come a point beyond which
[defendants] need not concern themselves with the arousal of dormant issues."
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In some circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice, courts have im-
posed a discovery rule exception which allows stale claims to proceed
despite the fact that they were initiated outside of the limitations period.
Application of the discovery rule exception, however, has been used
cautiously and only when one or more of the policy considerations un-
derlying the statute have been present.
B. The Discovery Rule Exception
Many courts across the country have used the discovery rule excep-
tion, or another legal tool, to permit the filing of sexual abuse lawsuits
twenty, thirty, forty or more years after the alleged abuse, based upon
recovered memory theory.7
A typical statute of limitations requires an action for personal injury,
such as intentional sexual abuse, to be filed within one to three years
from the date of the event." Only when principles of equity or excep-
tional circumstances exist do fundamental considerations of fairness
require that an exception be made to the statute of limitations.73 Prob-
Glimcher, supra note 58, at 513.
71. See infra Part I discussing statutes of limitations and application of the de-
layed discovery rule. In the following cases, courts have tolled the applicable statute
of limitations for plaintiffs claiming to have had a repressed memory of sexual abuse:
Borawick v. Shay, No. 5:92-CV-00033, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21201 (D. Conn. Nov. 17,
1992); Johnson v. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Hoult v. Hoult, 792 F.
Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1992); Carlson v. Rice, 832 F. Supp. 17 (D. Me. 1993); Sinclair v.
Brill, 815 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.H. 1993); Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 871 P.2d 698 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993); Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993); Phillips v. Johnson, 590
N.E.2d 4 (Il. App. Ct. 1992); Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1990);
Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 1995); KE. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509
(Minn. Ct App. 1990); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1993); Petersen v.
Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994); Jones
v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1992) (but see Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (refusing to toll statute of limitations for repressed memory
case)); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Ault v. Jasko, No. 92CA005344,
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1203 (Feb. 24, 1993), affd, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994); Olsen
v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987); see also Byrne v. Bercker, 501 N.W.2d 402 (Wis. 1988) (narrowing the
Hammer holding).
72. Francis E. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of
Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416, 438-40
(1981) (presenting a state-by-state case survey of the limitations of actions).
73. Developments, supra note 64, at 1203-05, 1213-19.
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lems arise, however, "when a personal injury does not occur immediate-
ly, or is not apparent at the time of the tortious conduct," leaving plain-
tiffs "blamelessly ignorant" 4 of their causes of action until after the ex-
piration of the limitations period."5 Rather than barring plaintiffs' claims,
courts counteract the potential injustice by applying the discovery
rule. 6
The discovery rule exception delays accrual of a plaintiffs cause of
action until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered, the alleged injury.77 Historically, the dis-
covery rule has been applied to claims of medical malpractice, toxic
torts, legal malpractice, workers' compensation, and product liability."
The discovery rule exception has achieved such wide acceptance that
with the exception of a "few ossified judges," "[v]irtually all commenta-
tors and the vast majority of courts" advocate its use.79 Application of
the discovery rule exception is not without parameters, however. The
discovery rule has been limited to cases where, in balancing the equities,
(1) the plaintiff would be severely and unfairly prejudiced by barring
his/her claim,' and (2) some form of physical evidence corroborating
the injury exists to diminish the likelihood that the claim is stale or
74. Author Susan Glimcher uses this phrase to refer to people who have difficulty
recognizing immediately the physical results of tortious conduct. See Glimcher, supra
note 58, at 523.
75. Id. at 501.
76. Id. at 502.
77. See Green, supra note 61, at 976. Courts use at least four separate formula-
tions to determine the accrual date of a cause of action under the discovery rule,
including: (1) discovery of the injury in fact (see, e.g., Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
275 S.E.2d 900 (Va. 1981)); (2) discovery of the injury and its cause (see, e.g.,
Andersen v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983)); (3) the discovery of the injury in
fact, the cause, and the availability of a legal remedy (see, e.g., Rose v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 796 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1986)); and (4) discovery of the injury in fact, the cause,
and plaintiffs appreciation of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct (see, e.g.,
Daly v. Derrick, 281 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Ct. App. 1991)).
78. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 164-68 (5th ed. 1984).
79. Green, supra note 61, at 977-78.
80. One commentator distinguished traditional tort claims (e.g. a car accident or
streetcar accident) from complex toxic tort claims where exposure to a toxic sub-
stance does not manifest itself until years later. Id. at 972-76. With the car accident,
a "snapshot" tort, the plaintiff will be adequately protected by strict application of the
statute of limitations' time period because the injury immediately follows defendant's
tortious conduct. Id. at 972. The accrual period is therefore readily ascertained. Id.
However, with respect to toxic torts, the injury is not readily ascertained and may
not manifest itself until decades later. Id. at 972-73. Here, the delayed discovery rule
counterbalances the unfairness that "blamelessly ignorant" plaintiffs would suffer if
knowledge of the inherently unknowable injury is imputed to them. Id. at 972.
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fraudulent.8' With respect to the existence of physically corroborating
evidence, one court noted:
Because of the availability and trustworthiness of objective verifiable evidence in
[medical malpractice and toxic tort] cases, the claims were neither speculative
nor incapable of proof. Since the evidentiary problems which the statute of limita-
tions is designed to prevent did not exist or were reduced, it was reasonable to
extend the period for bringing the actions."'
Thus, despite abrogating the limitations period, the court found that the
policies underlying the statute of limitations were nonetheless spared,
insofar as the risk of stale and fraudulent claims was minimized by the
existence of independent corroborative evidence.
Despite practical considerations involved in applying the discovery rule
exception, courts have permitted plaintiffs to sue defendants for alleged
sexual abuse premised upon recently recovered memories, or upon de-
layed psychological trauma or harm caused by abuse.' This has been
accomplished, for the most part, without any requirement that the plain-
tiff produce corroborative evidence to substantiate the ancient claim.'
The discovery rule has been the primary tool through which courts have
permitted plaintiffs to sue upon previously unknown claims, long after
the date on which the abuse may have occurred.'
81. See Tyson 'v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227-28 (Wash. 1986).
82. Id. at 228.
83. See supra notes 35 and 36.
84. See, e.g., Lemmerman v. Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993),
rev'd, 534 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 1995) ("We find it illogical to require corroborative evi-
dence under the delayed discovery rule."). In a surprise ruling, the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed, however, stating: "Alleged repression of memory of childhood sexual
abuse does not warrant invocation of Michigan's discovery rule or insanity disability
grace period to toll applicable tort statutes of limitations." 534 N.W.2d at 696; see
also Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989) (refusing to require corrobo-
rative evidence to support ancient sexual abuse claims). But see Meiers-Post v.
Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (repressed memory of sexual
abuse must be corroborated by physical evidence); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18
(Nev. 1990) (repressed memory of sexual abuse claim must be demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that the alleged abuse occurred); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d
1345 (Utah 1993) (repressed memory of sexual abuse must be proved by corroborat-
ing evidence).
85. See Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993). In Fager, the Indiana Supreme
Court rejected application of the discovery rule to ancient claims of sexual abuse
premised on repressed memories. Id. at 249-51. Instead, according to the court, such
plaintiffs must prove facts amounting to fraudulent concealment, estopping the defen-
dant from asserting the statute of limitations defense "when he has, either by decep-
tion or by a violation of [parental] duty, concealed from plaintiff material facts there-
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IV. REPRESSED MEMORIES, PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES, AND THE DISCOVERY
RULE EXCEPTION: CASE SURVEYS
In the seminal case of Tyson v. Tyson,' the Washington Supreme
Court refused to apply the discovery rule exception to toll the statute of
limitations for a plaintiff claiming to have "repressed" her memory of
childhood sexual abuse.87
The Tyson court explained that lawsuits premised on recovered memo-
ries are susceptible to the very dangers against which statutes of limita-
tion were enacted to protect.m The court cited three primary grounds
for barring the plaintiffs claims. First, the court stated:
As time passes, evidence becomes less available .... Physical evidence is also
more likely to be lost when a claim is stale, either because it has been misplaced,
or because its significance was not comprehended at the time of the alleged
wrong .... Thus, stale claims present major evidentiary problems which can seri-
ously undermine the courts' ability to determine the facts."'
Second, the court explained that application of the discovery rule ex-
ception was inappropriate when the only existing evidence of the claim
was the plaintiffs own subjective memories.' The court stated that the
discovery rule should be applied only when corroborative evidence
makes it "substantially certain that the facts can be fairly determined
even though considerable time has passed since the alleged events
occurred."9 1
by preventing the plaintiff from discovering a potential cause of action." Id. at 251.
86. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986). In Tyson, the plaintiff began to recall memories of
sexual abuse after visits to her therapist. Id. at 227. The alleged acts of abuse oc-
curred while plaintiff was between the ages of 3 and 11. Id. Washington's statute of
limitations for personal inury required that the plaintiff file the complaint within
three years of the injury or harm. Id. (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.080(2)). The ac-
crual period was tolled until plaintiff reached majority at 18 years of age. Id. The
defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs claim was
barred by the statute of limitations since the plaintiff was 26 when the claim was
filed. Id. The trial court certified the matter to the Washington Supreme Court to
determine whether the discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered a cause of action, applied in
this case. Id. at 226-27.
87. Id. at 229-30.
88. Id. at 227.
89. Id. at 227-28.
90. Id. at 229.
91. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs contention that evidence existed to corrob-
orate her claim. Id. The court found that as opposed to legitimate medical diagnosis,
"no empirical, verifiable evidence exists of the occurrences and resulting harm which
plaintiff alleges. [Plaintiffs] claim rests on a subjective assertion that wrongful acts
occurred and that injuries resulted." Id.
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Third, the Tyson court found that psychiatric testimony was inherently
subjective, failing to add corroboration to the plaintiffs claim.' The
court stated that eyewitness and psychological testimony of events that
allegedly transpired decades prior to the lawsuit were susceptible to
errors in recall and trustworthiness.93 Skeptical of psychiatry and its
corroborative value, the court added that psychologists could not reduce
the subjectivity of plaintiffs abuse claims because psychology and psy-
chiatry are "imprecise disciplines."' 4
The Tyson court exposed the many difficulties that courts across the
country would soon experience in their own jurisdictions when litigating
recovered memory cases. Namely, the court found that across-the-board
application of the discovery rule would: (1) undermine, and perhaps
eliminate, the statute of limitations defense, (2) compel courts to rely on
less than scientific evidence, a junk science of sorts, that could not af-
ford the certainty and precision a factfinder demands for fair and accu-
rate disposition of a case, and (3) prevent courts from being able to
weed out stale or fraudulent claims as there is no judicial, psychological,
or psychiatric mechanism that can be relied on in distinguishing false
claims of sexual abuse from true ones.9" The Tyson decision was quick-
ly reversed by statutory enactment.'
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court stated that the "psychoanalytic process can even lead to a dis-
tortion of the truth of events in the subject's past life. The analyst's reactions and
interpretations may influence the subject's memories about them . . . .Thus, the dis-
tance between historical truth and psychoanalytic 'truth' is quite a gulf." Id.
95. Id. at 227-30. The Cardinal Joseph Bernardin case highlights this aspect of the
Tyson court's decision. See Tom McNamee, Bernardin 'Vindicated'; Cardinal Dropped
From Suit; Accuser Says Memory Unreliable, CmI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at 1. The
court permitted Steven Cook to sue Cardinal Joseph Bernardin for sexual abuse de-
cades after the alleged abuse occurred. Id. Cook's memories were elicited by a thera-
pist during a hypnotic session. These "memories" were supposedly authenticated by a
second therapist and by a lie detector test. Cook's attorney filed a lawsuit based on
these memories. Id. Cook later retracted the allegations, withdrew the lawsuit, and
claimed the "memories" were false, inaccurate and unreliable. Id. As the Tyson court
implied, if two therapists, an attorney, and a lie detector test could not determine the
validity of the claims, how can we expect judges and lay jurors to accomplish the
task? See Carol Ness & Stephanie Salter, Therapists Split; Are Recovered Memories of
Abuse Real or False? Decisions Fall to the Courts, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1994, at 12;
Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
96. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1988) (incorporating discovery rule
exception for alleged adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse without requiring
corroborating evidence).
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In Hammer v. Hammer,7 a Wisconsin appellate court sharply depart-
ed from Tyson, holding that the statute of limitations for incestuous
abuse would not begin accruing until the victim discovered, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and
cause of the injury. In Hammer, the plaintiff claimed that while she
always remembered the sexual abuse, she did not know her present
psychological problems were caused by that abuse.'
Applying the discovery rule, the Hammer court balanced the policies
underlying the statute of limitations against the inequities resulting from
barring the plaintiffs claim."° The court stated that "'the injustice of
barring meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury out-
weighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions.'"'0 ' The Hammer court
was not as concerned with the policies supporting strict adherence to
the statute of limitations as they were with the gravity and outrageous-
ness of the plaintiffs allegations. 2 The court stated:
The policy justification for applying the statute of limitations to protect defen-
dants from "the threat of liability for deeds in the past" is unpersuasive in inces-
tuous abuse cases. Victims of incest have been harmed because of a "most egre-
gious violation of the parent/child relationship." To protect the parent at the ex-
pense of the child works an "intolerable perversion of justice."'
Realizing the breadth of its holding, the court added that the statute of
limitations defense was not "effectively eliminated" by its decision be-
cause plaintiffs "who negligently or purposefully fail to file a timely
claim" within the proscribed limitations period after remembering the
alleged abuse would still be barred."°
An outgrowth-and, perhaps, a significant flaw-of the Hammer deci-
sion is that plaintiffs may now have two separate causes of action accru-
ing at separate points in time.0 5 For example, a child may first sue the
97. 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. ct App. 1987).
98. Id. at 27.
99. Id. at 24. The sexual abuse allegedly occurred on average of three times a
week, beginning in 1969 when she was 5 years old and ending in 1978 when she
was 15. Id.
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id. (quoting Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 335 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Wis. 1983)).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Margaret J. Allen, Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse,
13 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 609, 631 (1983)). The court refused to look at the psy-
chological underpinnings of plaintiffs claims, refusing to acknowledge-as the Tyson
court did-the potential problems that might arise from cases of this nature. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 26. The court noted, "Even though a daughter may know that she has
been injured, until such time as she is able to shift the blame for the incestuous
abuse to her father, it will be impossible for her to realize that his behavior caused
her psychological disorders." Id. at 26-27 n.7 (quoting Margaret J. Allen, Comment,
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defendant for the physical manifestations of the injuries suffered at or
before reaching the age of majority. Then, the same plaintiff may sue
again upon "discovering" the latent emotional or psychological injuries
not known or contemplated until years later."° The court expressed no
opinion as to whether the plaintiff could initially sue the defendant for
the physical harm and then, decades later, sue the defendant for latent
psychological harm that subsequently arises.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to expand the Hammer holding
when it decided Byrne v. Bercker °7 In Byrne, the court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the Wisconsin statute of limitations for child-
hood sexual abuse should be tolled until the plaintiff was able to "'shift
the blame to her father,' rather than blame herself as most incest victims
do.-"108
Rejecting plaintiffs "shifting the blame" argument, the court stated:
[While] therapists take the position that healing is not possible until the plaintiff
undergoes an epiphany which in some mysterious way makes it possible for her
to say that she is blameless and the perpetrator is solely to blame... we think it
is inappropriate to tailor statutes of limitation[s] to therapeutic goals in derogation
of the specific test of the statute of limitations.'09
This rationale seems disingenuous at best. Arguably, the Hammer court
tailored the statute of limitations to therapeutic goals when it permitted
Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 609, 630 (1983)).
106. In Hammer, the plaintiff claimed that while she knew of the abuse in the de-
cades leading up to the lawsuit, her psychological coping mechanisms prohibited her
from "being able to perceive or know the existence or nature of her psychological
injuries until entering therapy." Id. at 24-25.
107. 501 N.W.2d 402 (Wis. 1993).
108. Id. at 404 (quoting Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987)). In Byrne, the plaintiff served her 80-year-old father with a complaint at a
nursing home for allegedly incestuously abusing her at intervals between 1940 and
1950. Id. at 402. Memories of the sexual abuse were "repressed" until she entered
therapy in 1986. Id. Initially, she claimed that health care workers at a hospital sexu-
ally abused her. Id. at 403. The hospital referred her to a psychologist who then
elicited memories of the alleged incestuous relationship with her father. Id.
109. Id. at 406. Interestingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review of Ham-
mer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev. denied, 428 N.W.2d 552
(Wis. 1988), in essence sanctioning other psychological phenomena such as "repres-
sion," "dissociation," and "great shame," but refused to acknowledge the "shifting the
blame" phenomenon, another "psychological defense mechanism." Further, Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 893.587 (West Supp. 1995) codified the Hammer holding. See Byrne, 501
N.W.2d at 406 (deviating from the previously enacted statute of limitations). Wiscon-
sin courts appear to have become the final arbiter of what are acceptable psycho-
logical theories capable of tolling the Wisconsin statute of limitations.
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the plaintiff to sue for latent psychological harm decades after the al-
leged sexual abuse."'
Undoubtedly, Tyson v. Tyson and Hammer v. Hammer represented
the foundation for the 1990s new sexual abuse jurisprudence. What fol-
lowed was an attempt by American courts to distinguish Hammer cases
from Tyson cases. A dichotomy resulted in which courts distinguished
Hammer cases, where the plaintiff claimed to have known about the
sexual abuse at or before majority but did not realize that other physical
and psychological problems were caused by the abuse (Type I cases),
from Tyson type cases, where the plaintiff alleged that she repressed the
memory of the sexual abuse until shortly before filing the lawsuit (Type
II cases)."'
A. The Type I Plaintiff
Only a minority of courts permit Type I plaintiffs to sue the alleged
abuser decades after the abuse occurred."2 Several other states have
110. In addition, for therapists and adult survivors of childhood incest, the court-
room is part of the therapy and recovery process. Thus, deviation from traditional
statute of limitations jurisprudence is necessary to complete the therapeutic process
for many alleged survivors of incest. See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist
Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L REV. 575, 584-85 (1993) ("For the victim of
intrafamilial sexual abuse, a tort suit offers the opportunity to be the court's central
concern rather than merely a peripheral subject of the defendant's criminal conduct.
It offers the victim the opportunity to tell of her suffering, be believed by a jury, and
vindicate her experiences through an award of damages.").
111. See, e.g., Messina v. Bonner, 813 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Penn. 1991) (example of
Type I case); Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (example of
Type II case); see also Anne M. Hagen, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Adult
Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L REV. 355, 373 (1991) (discussing the
two types of plaintiffs); Jocelyn B. Lamm, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Vic-
tims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L J.
2189 (1991) (same).
112. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (discussing Hammer v. Ham-
mer); see, e.g., Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1991). In addition, the Nevada
Supreme Court has issued a broad holding that could allow a Type I plaintiff to sue
upon discovering the psychological impact of known abuse that occurred decades
earlier. Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990). For jurisdictions that prohibit
Type I plaintiffs from suing, see Derose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App.
1987); Franke v. Geyer, 568 N.E.2d 931 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991); E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d
817 (Mont. 1988); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624 (Okla 1992); Doe v. Coffee
County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Whatcott v. Whatcott,
790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). But see Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo. Ct
App. 1991); ABC & XYZ v. The Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 513 N.W.2d
482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 629 N.E.2d 402
(Ohio 1994); E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 622 A.2d 1388 (Penn. 1993).
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enacted statutory provisions that might also embrace a Type I plaintiffs
facts.1
3
In ABC & XYZ v. The Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis,"4 a
Minnesota court rejected the Hammer/Daly approach, finding that the
plaintiffs subjective discovery that known abuse caused latent psycho-
logical injuries was too open-ended a standard for application of the
discovery rule."' Thus, the court found as a matter of law that the
plaintiff knew or should have known that her relationship with the defen-
dant was abusive."' Rejecting the subjectivity of plaintiffs claim, the
court stated:
It is unreasonable to suggest that ABC never realized the true nature of this abu-
sive relationship even though she had known the relationship was wrong from the
outset .... To recognize a subjective standard and allow this case to go to trial
would open the floodgates to suits long since time-barred."7
In a similar case,' E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia,"' the plain-
tiff also remembered the abuse, but claimed he was not aware of the
psychological effects of the abuse."' The court stated that it is in the
rare battery case that a plaintiff cannot discern the totality of the dam-
age.' The court stated, "Inclusion of plaintiff's mental incapacity as a
factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of plaintiffs
diligence runs counter to [the reasonable person standard]."'
Other courts have found different grounds for denying the Type I
plaintiff access to the courtroom long after the alleged abuse. In E. W. v.
113. See ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 09.10.140 (1994) (tolling statute of limitations for adult
survivors of incest until discovery of the fact and cause of the injury or condition);
see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340(B) (West Supp. 1996) (tolling statute of
limitations until victim knew or had reason to know); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073,
subd. 2(a) (West Supp. 1996) (same). But see ABC & XYZ, 513 N.W.2d 482 (rejecting
statutory construction to permit Type I plaintiff to sue).
114. 513 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
115. Id. at 486. ABC always remembered the abuse but claimed that as a result of
the relationship she felt "exploited," "depressed," and viewed making love with her
husband as something "dirty." Id. at 485. She claimed that it was not until after en-
tering therapy that "she was able to recognize that she had been a victim of abuse."
Id.
116. Id. at 486-87.
117. Id. at 487.
118. 622 A.2d 1388 (Penn. 1993).
119. Id. at 1388-89.
120. Id. at 1394.
121. Id. (quoting Barren by Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir.
1988)).
D.C.H.,'22 the Montana Supreme Court refused to toll the statute of lim-
itations, finding that the Type I plaintiffs knowledge of the abuse was
sufficient as a matter of law to require that plaintiff inquire into the
cause of the injury."2 The court stated that to allow a Type I plaintiff
who fails to inquire into the cause of an injury to avoid the time bar
"'under the guise of "discovery" would hopelessly demolish the protec-
tion afforded defendants by the statute.""24 Thus, in Montana, a Type I
plaintiff is charged with knowledge of the psychological effects of abuse
and will be barred from suing the abuser unless the suit is filed within
the applicable statutory limitations period.125
In Messina v. Bonner,'26 a federal district court applying Pennsylva-
nia law looked to the policies underlying the statute of limitations to
determine whether the discovery rule was available to a Type I plain-
tiff.'27 The court rejected application of the discovery rule, stating that
"[i]f such an open-ended discovery rule were applied, suits could be
maintained against defendants who would not only be much older and
more infirm than plaintiffs, but who would also more likely be dead." 2 '
The Messina court commented, "Psychology has, since the time of
Freud, been in the business of exploring and finding subjective reality.
Courts, on the other hand, are in the business of trying to find objective
reality.'
29
122. 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988).
123. Id. at 820. In E.W., the plaintiff claimed that since she "did not associate her
psychological problems" with the known abuse, the statute of limitations should have
been tolled until the "causal relationship" was discovered. Id. at 817-18.
124. Id. at 820 (quoting Much v. Storm Ruger & Co., 502 F. Supp. 743, 745-46 (D.
Mont. 1980)).
125. Id. at 820-21. Similarly, in Bowser v. Guttendorf, 541 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988), the Pennsylvania court held that a Type I plaintiff, upon learning of the abuse,
"must investigate the situation and ascertain who might be legally culpable." Id. at
380. This is true irrespective of whether the plaintiff is aware that someone may be
legally responsible for plaintiffs injury. Id. For a similar holding, see Hildebrand v.
Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512, 1521 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that Type I plaintiffs
are on notice that they have been harmed and have a duty to investigate whether
they have a cause of action).
126. 813 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
127. Id. at 348-49.
128. Id. at 349. The court further stated, "In a case like this, where over two de-
cades have passed since the alleged misconduct began, it is easy to imagine how
witnesses could be deceased or become unavailable, memories could fade to black,
or tangible evidence simply disappear." Id.
129. Id. at 351. The court colorfully added:
[Clases like this call upon courts to re-enact Rashomon. As in the great Jap-
anese drama, the characters here all recite their stories with evident sinceri-
ty. But is it possible for courts in these cases to get to the truth any more
than was possible in the classic Japanese play? The [plaintiffs] firmly believe
that these horrid acts occurred, but to what extent could the images depicted
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Recent decisions such as Messina indicate that courts are viewing
Type I cases and their psychotherapeutic underpinnings with increasing
skepticism. Courts are again returning to policies underlying statutes of
limitations to stop this flood of litigation.
The common thread running through decisions rejecting the Type I
plaintiffs claim rests, in part, on the "snapshot" theory underlying the
statute of limitations.3 ° If courts permit a Type I sexual abuse plaintiff
to sue, the same logic would permit a minor involved in a traumatic car
accident to sue thirty or forty years later. 3' In Fager v. Hundt,'3 the
Indiana Supreme Court refused to apply the discovery rule to a Type I
plaintiff for this very reason.33 The Fager court found that if the sexu-
ally abused minor could sue years later for the abuse, then "a middle-
aged claimant, suddenly learning that he had been involved as an infant
in an automobile accident, could attempt to invoke the discovery rule to
assert an action seeking damages for a permanent medical condition
allegedly resulting, " "3
If this were permitted, statutes of limitations would be completely
obviated in cases of ordinary injuries to children whose developmental
limitations impaired or precluded their capacity to discover that an injury
resulted from another person's tortious act.'35
From Tyson to Hammer to Messina, courts have come full circle with
respect to Type I plaintiffs within a six-year time frame." In Hammer,
the Wisconsin court proclaimed that allowing the statute of limitations to
protect the adult sexual abuser at the expense of the child worked "an
intolerable perversion of justice."'37 Several years later, in Messina, a
be refractions of resonant suggestions of others? [The defendant] denies that
any such acts occurred, but is this the result of age, the death of gray cells,
or more than a little psychological "denial?"
Id.
130. See Green, supra note 61, at 972.
131. See Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 1993).
132. 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993).
133. Id. at 250-51. The same conclusion would be equally applicable to the Type I
plaintiff. See id.
134. Id. at 251.
135. Id. However, the court permitted the Type I plaintiff to sue under the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment. Id. The court stated that "the fraudulent concealment ex-
ception does not establish a new date for commencement of the statute of limita-
tions, but rather creates an equitable exception" to the statute of limitations. Id.
136. See supra notes 86-129 and accompanying text
137. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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Pennsylvania district court asked, "Is there any reason to suppose that
courts are better equipped to determine these questions than Sigmund
Freud?""
B. The Type H Plaintiff
The Type II plaintiff is generally characterized as having "repressed" all
memory of the sexual abuse until shortly before filing the lawsuit."9
Only a handful of courts have refused to toll the statute of limitations for
Type II recovered memory cases. 4'
The Type II plaintiff proves the "best fit" for discovery rule application
since she alleges complete memory "repression." Put another away, con-
trary to a Type I plaintiff who has always remembered the abuse, the
Type II plaintiff is "blamelessly ignorant" of the abuse until a point in
time usually after the statute of limitations period has expired. Courts
have frequently held that barring an unknown claim is inequitable and
prejudicial to plaintiffs.'
In Johnson v. Johnson, the plaintiff alleged that she "repressed" all
memory of sexual abuse that had occurred twenty years earlier while she
was a minor.' The court found that the plaintiff was "blamelessly igno-
rant" of the abuse and could not be held to the limitations period for
bringing an action. '43 Seized by the gross allegations of the plaintiffs
complaint, the court found that problems of proof are not the gravamen
of discovery rule application; rather, the severity of the crime or tort
alleged is the governing factor.'" The court then held that plaintiffs
138. Messina v. Bonner, 813 F. Supp. 346, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
139. This is the prototypical "repressed memory" lawsuit. See, e.g., Carlson v. Rice,
836 F. Supp. 17 (D. Me. 1993); Sinclair v. Brill, 815 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.H. 1993); John-
son v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 871 P.2d
698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993); Meiers-Post v.
Schafer, 727 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev.
1990); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); McCollum v. D'Arcy, No. 92-601,
1989 N.J. LEXIS 73 (Mar. 15, 1994); Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
140. See Farris v. Compton, 802 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1992); Baily v. Lewis, 763 F.
Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989); Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); Anon-
ymous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Tyson v. Tyson, 727
P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
141. See Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
142. Id. at 1364-65. Plaintiff alleged that the "suppression of these memories was a
self-protecting measure which prevented Plaintiff from knowing, recognizing, and un-
derstanding the nature of her injuries and the fact of their causal relationship to
Defendant's . . .sexual abuse." Id.
143. Id. at 1369-70.
144. Id. The court stated that it would be a "'cruel hoax to deny a widow and 4
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cause of action would not accrue until plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of her injury and its wrongful cause.' While the Johnson court
acknowledged that the defendant would have had difficulty disproving
the events alleged, it did not require the plaintiff to present corroborative
evidence to substantiate the claim.'46
In Ault v. Jasko,'47 however, the Ohio Supreme Court sought to justi-
fy application of the discovery rule within the traditional statute of limi-
tations framework. 4 ' In Ault, the plaintiff alleged complete repression
of memories of sexual abuse.' In accepting plaintiffs argument that
the discovery rule should apply, the court found that the four policy
goals advanced by the statute of limitations would still be met. '5 First,
the court stated that application of the discovery rule to the defendant
was in fact "fair" because the defendant could still offer circumstantial
evidence to rebut the plaintiffs claims."' Second, the court found that
the statute of limitations could not enhance the promptness of claims
unless the plaintiff in fact knew she had a claim.'52 Third, the court
found that the risk of stale and fraudulent claims was not worth denying
"[p]laintiffs with valid claims ... the opportunity to prove that repression
of memory precluded them from bringing their claims within the statute
of limitations period."" Finally, the court found that while the defen-
dant would experience problems with proof, this burden was a minor
defect outweighed by the need for remedy of the injury."
The Ault court's attempt to justify application of the discovery rule
within this context fails inasmuch as it relies on the outrageousness of
minor children an opportunity to test the case on the merits because the widow
failed to decipher ... [a] medical term.'" Id. (quoting Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 380
N.E.2d 1376, 1386 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978)).
145. Id. at 1370.
146. Id. at 1369-70.
147. 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994).
148. Id. at 871-73.
149. Id. at 871. According to the plaintiff, she was molested by her father when she
was 12, but the memory was repressed until she reached age 20. Id. Defendant
moved to dismiss on grounds that the one-year statute of limitations began to run
when plaintiff reached 18, the age of majority. Id. at 870. Plaintiff contended that
since she filed her claim within one year of discovery the abuse, the statute of limi-
tations had not run. Id. at 871.
150. Id. at 871-73.
151. Id. at 872.
152. Id. at 872-73.
153. Id. at 873.
154. Id.
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the alleged acts to justify tolling the statute of limitations.'55 Moreover,
conceding that problems of proof exist, application of the discovery rule
harms not only the defendant, but the court and jury alike who are a
necessary part of this equation. If courts like Ault are balancing the equi-
ties, they must consider all of the factors, including the potential for
fraud upon the court, the defendant's difficulty in defending the case,
and the jury's ability to fairly and accurately determine the facts."
When no independent, physically corroborating facts exist to substantiate
such claims, who wins may be determined only by who hires the best
attorney(s) and expert witness(es). This is why an increasing number of
courts have answered the "proof problem" by requiring that Type II
plaintiffs present corroborative evidence of their allegations.'57
In Meiers-Post v. Schafer," the Michigan Court of Appeals weighed
the consequences of accepting uncorroborated Type II claims of sexual
abuse.'59 The court admitted that "[tihe issue which so troubled the
Washington Supreme Court [in Tyson]" was not present in Meiers-Post
because the defendant corroborated the plaintiffs memories by admitting
that he committed the sexual acts."'° Thus, the court held that the
Michigan statute of limitations would be tolled under the insanity clause
when "(a) plaintiff can make out a case that she had repressed the mem-
ory of the facts upon which her claim is predicated.., and (b) there is
corroboration for plaintiffs testimony that the sexual assault oc-
curred."
6
'
As the plaintiffs claims were corroborated by independent, objectively
verifiable evidence, the court remanded the case to the lower court for
further proceedings.'62 The Meiers-Post court, however, offered no
opinion on what type of corroborative evidence would satisfy the second
part of their holding.
In a recent Michigan appellate decision, Lemmerman v. Fealk," the
court rejected the Meiers-Post holding and held that a Type II plaintiff
could sue without independent corroborating evidence."6 Contrary to
both Meiers-Post and Nicolette v. Carey," the plaintiff in Levnmerman
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. See Ault, 637 N.E.2d at 870-73.
157. See, e.g., Meiers-Post v. Shafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
158. 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
159. Id. at 607-10.
160. Id. at 610.
161. Id.
162. Id. The court commented that requiring corroborative evidence "strikes a fair
balance between the risk of stale claims and the unfairness of precluding justifiable
causes of action." Id.
163. 507 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
164. Id. at 229.
165. 751 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Mich. 1990). Meiers-Post was followed by Nicolette v.
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offered no corroborative evidence of the sexual abuse.'" The court
found it "illogical to require corroborating evidence under the delayed
discovery rule... [where flundamental fairness, not availability of objec-
tive evidence, has been the 'linchpin of the discovery rule.""67 Thus, in
the first true challenge to the Meiers-Post holding, the Michigan Court of
Appeals acquiesced to the outrageousness of plaintiffs allegations of
sexual abuse, thereby permitting the case to proceed without any corrob-
orative evidence.'"
However, in a Utah case, Olsen v. Hooley,ai the plaintiffs sued the
defendant for sexual abuse that had been "repressed" for twelve
years. ' Skeptical of repressed memory theory, the court held:
[Blecause of concerns about the reliability of memory in general to events that oc-
curred long ago, apart from repression, and the difficulty of defending against
claims of revived memories of sexual abuse, we think it necessary to require that
a plaintiff who alleges repression of memory as a basis of tolling the statute of
limitations produce corroborating evidence in support of the allegation of
abuse.
17
1
For the Olsen court, corroborative evidence included "evidence that a
defendant committed similar acts against other persons or evidence of
contemporaneous physical manifestations of the abuse.'1
2
Carey, 751 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Mich. 1990), in which the court held that a Type I
plaintiff could sue after producing independent corroborative evidence of the sexual
abuse in the form of a letter signed by the defendant. Id. at 699-700.
166. Lemmerman, 507 N.W.2d at 229.
167. Id. (quoting Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 231 (Wash. 1986) (Pearson, J., dis-
senting)).
168. Id. at 229-30. The court stated, "We believe that plaintiffs claims should not be
sacrificed in favor of a policy discouraging stale claims." Id. at 230. The Michigan Su-
preme Court later reversed the appellate court. 534 N.W.2d 695, 704 (Mich. 1995).
169. 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993).
170. Id. at 1346. The plaintiff allegedly suffered from dissociation causing memory
repression and unbearable stress combined with violent emotions caused by the trau-
ma. Id.
171. Id. at 1350. In addition, the court stated, "Because of the dearth of empirical
scientific evidence regarding the authenticity and reliability of revived memories, ...
the inherent reliability and admissibility of expert witness testimony regarding memo-
ry repression and revival may be an issue that will have to be reached at trial." Id.
(internal citation omitted).
172. Id. In a similar Type II case, Conrad v. Dray, No. 05-92-02867-CV, 1994 WL
59968 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1994), a Texas appellate court also required corrobora-
tive evidence to substantiate the Type II claim. However, the court held that expert
testimony regarding plaintiffs "repression" and post traumatic stress disorder would
satisfy the corroborating requirement. Id. at *7-8.
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Nevada courts have responded still differently to Type II claims. In
Petersen v. Bruen,'73 the Nevada Supreme Court recognized the grave
problems that might arise from the unqualified application of the discov-
ery rule to Type II claims.'74 The court held that "no existing statute of
limitations applies to bar the action of an adult survivor of CSA [child-
hood sexual abuse] when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence
that the plaintiff has in fact been sexually abused during minority by the
named defendant."'75 The court stated that when abuse has been satis-
factorily proven, there is "no compelling need or policy which justifies
the intervention of a period of limitations to eliminate the right of CSA
victims to seek recovery against their abusers."'76
The Petersen decision offers perhaps the best compromise for this
very difficult issue: How can meritless claims of "false memories" be
eliminated from courtrooms, while permitting meritorious claims to pro-
ceed? While the express language of Petersen eliminates the statute of
limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse, it protects wary defen-
dants, courts and juries from therapeutically induced, uncorroborated
"false memories" of sexual abuse claims. The Petersen decision would
allow the Meiers-Post plaintiff to proceed, while eliminating the threat of
repeating the Cardinal Bernardin affair.'
In addition, Petersen seems broad enough to permit the Type I plaintiff
to sue as well. This may be the greatest paradox involved in the new age
of sexual abuse litigation: the Type I plaintiff, who at least remembers
the abuse, is prohibited from suing in a majority of states while the Type
II plaintiff, whose entire case rests upon the scientifically questionable
theory of "memory repression," is allowed to sue in a majority of states.
If courts are to be vigilant with respect to the outrageousness of child-
hood sexual abuse, then these same courts must be equally vigilant in
permitting the Type I plaintiff to sue. Childhood sexual abuse is abhor-
rent and there is no compelling reason for barring a plaintiffs sexual
abuse claim because of the statute of limitations when the claim is ade-
quately proven by independent corroborative evidence.
On the other hand, New York courts have remained steadfast in their
refusal to permit both Type I and Type II plaintiffs from suing.'78 In
173. 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990).
174. Id. In doing so, the court considered the policy rationales in support of and
against the discovery rule. Id. at 20.
175. Id. at 24-25.
176. Id. at 23.
177. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987); Overall v. Klotz, 846 F.
Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bassile v. Covenant House, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Burpee v.
Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
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New York, in order to toll the statute of limitations for sexual abuse, a
plaintiff must prove that she was legally insane, demonstrating an overall
inability to protect her legal rights and an inability to function in society
during the tolling period.' Thus, in New York, a Type II plaintiff can-
not sue even if the defendant subsequently admits to committing the
acts. 180
However, in Anonymous v. Anonymous,' a Type I plaintiff sued her
next-door neighbor, complaining that he sexually abused her from 1967
through 1987." While the court found "mere repression... insufficient
to toll the Statute of Limitations," the court stated that repression might
be "one of a bundle of claimed injuries, the totality of which, if estab-
lished, would indicate an overall inability to function in society."" o The
court remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera hearing to
determine the truthfulness of the allegations and decide whether the
limitations period should be tolled."s
While a majority of courts permit the Type II plaintiff to sue based on
memory repression, there is by no means a consensus approach to these
unique cases. For some courts, mere allegation of memory repression
automatically tolls the statute of limitations accrual date." Other
courts require the plaintiff to present some form of corroborative evi-
dence to substantiate the ancient claim." But even among courts that
require corroborative evidence, there is dispute as to what constitutes
physically corroborating evidence so as to justify tolling the statute of
limitations."S7
179. See Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61. Furthermore, the plaintiff "must demon-
strate inter alia that she suffered not merely from a neurosis [that caused re-
pression] but was beyond question 'overall mentally disabled.'" Id. at 362.
180. Id. "New York does not follow the proposition that the mere claim or even
proof of an admission by the defendant will warrant avoidance of the time limit
fixed by a [sitatute of [l]imitations." Id.
181. 584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
182. Id. at 716.
183. Id. at 720-21.
184. Id. at 721-22.
185. See Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 63 (D.C. 1994); McCollum v. Darcy, 138
A.2d 797, 798 (N.H. 1994).
186. See e.g., Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
187. See Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 23-24 (Nev. 1990) (holding that "[n]o exist-
ing statute of limitations applies to bar the action of an adult survivor of CSA when
it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff has in fact been
abused during minority by the named defendant."); Nicolette v. Carey, 751 F. Supp.
695 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (letter admitting to abuse sufficient corroborative evidence for
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Clearly, if courts are concerned that innocent persons are being stig-
matized as pedophiles and sued in open court, more must be done to
eliminate the likelihood that lawsuits premised on "false memories" are
being filed in American courtrooms.
V. PROTECTING DEFENDANT FROM FALSE CLAIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE
Without question, many persons have been falsely accused of sexually
abusing their children or other minors since repressed memory therapy
became an oft-used psychotherapeutic technique. Within the past two
years, accusations have increased at an enormous rate-from 250 accusa-
tions reported as of March 1992 to over 11,000 accusations reported as of
March 1994."s
Despite overwhelming evidence that false accusations of sexual abuse
are being made, the already stigmatized accused has little or no remedy
upon being vindicated of the charges. If society is to be so vigilant with
respect to the adult survivor of incest, the same vigilance should be ac-
corded to those falsely accused of committing incest.
A. Requirement of Independent, Objectively Verifiable Evidence
that Establishes Clear and Convincing Proof of the Alleged Sexual
Abuse; and Elimination of Statutes of Limitations for Both Type I
and Type H Plaintiffs
To eliminate the threat of false or fraudulent sexual abuse claims,
courts should require independent and objectively verifiable corrobora-
tive evidence to substantiate the alleged abuse. This rule should apply
equally to Type I and Type II plaintiffs. The threshold of proof necessary
to proceed with such suits must amount to clear and convincing evi-
dence that substantiates the claims." This evidence should be re-
viewed in camera by the trial judge either shortly after the complaint is
filed or shortly after the discovery period."9
tolling statute of limitations); Conrad v. Dray, No. 05-92-02867-CV, 1994 WL 59968
(Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1994) (expert psychiatric testimony could satisfy requirement
that "recovered" memory be corroborated).
188. FMS FOUND. NEWSL., Mar. 8, 1994, at 1, 1.
189. See Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 24-25 (Nev. 1990) (holding that the running
of the statute of limitations will not bar a suit brought by an adult survivor of child-
hood sexual abuse when clear and convincing evidence establishes that the abuse oc-
curred).
190. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713, 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (re-
quiring fact-finding hearing on the issues prior to deciding whether the statute of
limitations was tolled).
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Second, if courts are to be truly vigilant with respect to their abhor-
rence for claims of childhood sexual abuse, they should eliminate the
statute of limitations with respect to all childhood sexual abuse claims,
both Type I and Type II, that are established by clear and convincing
proof of the alleged abuse, as Nevada courts have done. 9 ' One scholar
has noted that eliminating statutes of limitations in toxic substances
litigation (where there is objective proof of the injury) would serve to
enhance the quality of evidence presented at trial. In turn, this would
permit the plaintiff to gather additional corroborative proof of the injury,
thereby increasing the quality of evidence presented at trial and ensuring
that the case is fairly and accurately decided and not arbitrarily dis-
missed. ' 2
Similarly, eliminating statutes of limitations for Type I and Type II
plaintiffs will increase the quality and degree of proof in these cases. A
plaintiff would not be compelled to quickly file unsubstantiated or false
claims of sexual abuse against an alleged abuser simply because a limita-
tions period may expire. Rather, the plaintiff could further investigate the
memory, obtain a second therapist's opinion, and elicit information and
evidence from persons then living, e.g., doctors, friends, relatives, or
even the alleged abuser. This approach would help to achieve a delicate
balance between eliminating false claims of abuse and providing the
accuser with an unlimited time in which to substantiate her claim, per-
mitting the meritorious claim to proceed to suit.
B. Third-Party Lawsuits Against Therapists
Another way courts and legislatures can diminish the increasing num-
ber of false claims of sexual abuse being filed is to permit the falsely
accused person to sue the unethical or unscrupulous therapist who
elicited the false memory for negligent misdiagnosis.'9 3 However, a ma-
jority of courts hold that a mental health professional owes no duty to a
third person for misdiagnosis."
In Bird v. WC.W, a father who had been cleared of criminal allega-
tions that he sexually abused his child sued the psychologist who misdi-
191. See id.; see also Green, supra note 61, at 969 (advocating the elimination of
statutes of limitations in toxic substances litigation).
192. See Green, supra note 61, at 989.
193. See Elizabeth Loftus & Laura Rosenwald, Buried Memories/Shattered Lives, 79
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 70, 70-73.
194. See, e.g., Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
agnosed his son.'95 The court held that "there is no professional duty
running from a psychologist to a third party to not negligently misdiag-
nose a condition of a patient."" The court reasoned that permitting
third-party lawsuits against therapists had to be considered "in light of
countervailing concerns, including the social utility of eradicating sexual
abuse.
-197
However, Ramona v. Isabella'98 is considered to be the first case in
which the target of a civil sexual abuse claim based on repressed memo-
ries subsequently sued the therapist who elicited the memory." In
Ramona, Gary Ramona's daughter, Holly, visited a therapist for treat-
ment of an eating disorder known as bulimia.2 ° Ultimately, the thera-
pist diagnosed Holly as having been sexually abused as a child.2"' The
therapist apparently treated Holly with sodium amytol to "recover" the
memories.2 Holly confronted Ramona at his workplace, informing the
company that he had sexually abused her."3 As a result, Gary Ramona
lost his $300,000.00 per year job and was ostracized by friends, family,
and the Napa Valley community that he had called home for twenty
years.2"' In this case, a jury ordered the psychiatrist to pay Holly's par-
ents $500,000. °' In two earlier cases, one in Pennsylvania and one in
Texas, similar awards were granted to parents against psychiatrists.2" If
these cases survive appeal, the collateral effect of the decisions will be
to cause therapists to be more cautious in therapy and protect patients
and parents alike against the threat of false memories.
195. Id. at 768.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 769.
198. No. C61898 (Napa County Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1994).
199. See Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 193, at 71.
200. See Ramona v. Isabella, No. C61898 (Napa County Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1994).
201. See id.
202. Sodium amytol is a barbiturate. See American Society of Hospital Pharmacists,
American Hospital Formulary Service, Barbiturates, at *2, 17 (Feb. 1991). It is used
among other purposes, for hypnosis and pseudomemories. See Ofshe & Watters, supra
note 2. The therapist told Holly Ramona that 80% of those suffering from eating dis-
orders were sexually abused as children. See Jane M. Adams, Napa Trial Tests "Re-
covered Memory" of Abuse, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 25, 1994, at BI. Ms. Ramona at
first denied the abuse, but after sodium amytol treatment, became convinced that she
had memories of sexual abuse. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Dad Takes Stand Against Daughter's Therapists; Denies Sex Abuse, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Mar. 26, 1994, at B5.
205. See Thom Weidlich, 'False' Memory, Big Award, NAT. L.J., Jan. 9, 1995, at 49,
49.
206. See id.
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C. Uniform Standards of Treatment Based on Generally Accepted and
Scientifically Verified Psychiatric or Psychological Techniques
Any attorney who defends delayed sexual abuse claims premised on
repressed memories or delayed discovery of the causal consequences of
previously known abuse concentrates on two factors: (1) the therapist
and his or her qualifications, and (2) the technique used by the therapist
to elicit the memory."7 With respect to the latter qualification, the nov-
ice attorney will learn an entire new vocabulary that includes such con-
cepts as guided imagery, body work, primal therapy, Rolfing, hypnosis,
age regression, and psychodrama.2"
The American Medical Association has rejected many of these unprov-
en therapies and has stated that hypnosis, combined with therapeutic
techniques such as age regression,"° do not enhance a subject's memo-
ry with regard to previously repressed or forgotten memories.1 ° In fact,
the American Medical Association has taken the position that
there is no evidence of increased recollection by means of hypnosis for recall
memory of meaningless material or of recognition memory for any types of ma-
terial. When hypnosis is used for recall of meaningless past events, there is often
new information reported. This may include accurate information as well as con-
fabulations and pseudomemories~"
The American Medical Association recommends that any therapist using
hypnosis should use the following specific safeguards to protect the
welfare of the subject and the public: (1) perform a psychological assess-
ment of the patient prior to inducing hypnosis so as to establish what
memory the patient has prior to hypnosis, (2) obtain informed consent of
207. Steven Cook withdrew his case against Cardinal Joseph Bernardin after his.
therapist and his therapist's qualifications and memory enhancing techniques were
challenged by defense attorneys for Cardinal Bernardin. Cook's therapist apparently
obtained his therapy degree through mail order via an unaccredited school. See Tom
McNamee, Bernardin 'Vindicated'; Cardinal Dropped From Suit; Accuser Says Memo-
ry Unreliable, CM. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at 1; Daniel J. Lehman, Doubts About
Therapist Hurt Case, Cm. SUN-TMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at 1; Jan Crawford, Bernardin's
Accuser Has Potential Problem; Validity of Therapist, Hypnosis Session Will Face
Challenge, Cm. SUN-TMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at IN; Paul Kenny and Howard Wieder, Re-
covered Memory and Statute of Limitations, N.Y.LJ. June 23, 1995, at 1.
208. See Taylor, supra note 50, at 81.
209. Age regression theory holds that a patient under hypnosis can revert to and
reexperience a traumatic event. See Counsel on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of
Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918, 1919 (1985).
210. Id. at 1922.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
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the patient prior to inducing hypnosis and describe the pitfalls of the
process that potentially include the creation of pseudomemories, and (3)
be a skilled psychiatrist or psychologist who has knowledge of the legal
implications of the use of hypnosis.2"2 Of these recommendations, re-
quiring that therapists obtain informed consent from the patient is per-
haps the best starting point. The informed consent should require that all
patients be told that "false memories" can by elicited, or remembered,
because of these psychological techniques.
The American Psychological Association, Working Group on Investiga-
tion of Memories of Childhood Abuse, recommended to the Board of
Directors: that the association will not take sides on the controversy on
recovered memories; that it is possible to retrieve a lost memory, and
that it is also possible to create a false belief."3
Courts across the country should begin to question the validity of the
numerous therapy techniques that are used by therapists to elicit memo-
ries. Many of these techniques remain scientifically unproven, unsanc-
tioned by both psychiatric and psychological communities, and can cause
false memories of early childhood events.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new breed of litigation has erupted in American courts with the
acceptance of both Type I and Type II sexual abuse lawsuits. It is too
early to tell whether these cases will become a mainstay of American
jurisprudence or whether they will eventually fade away as remnants of
another witch hunt. Signals have started to appear on the horizon, how-
ever, that forecast that the days of the "recovered memory" and its dev-
astating consequences are coming to an end.
The scientific community and professional organizations have started
to present strong views that deny or severely question the realities of
recovered memory theory. At least one state legislature that enacted
extensions or exceptions to previous statutes of limitations laws in child-
hood sexual abuse cases has tried to rethink its position. Concurrently,
some courts have begun to accept lawsuits against professionals by vic-
tims, as well as third parties, in falsely recovered memory cases.
Nevertheless, there is still much to be done. Members of the scientific
community and professional organizations should continue to expose the
unrealities of recovered memories, state legislatures should revive the
212. Id. at 1922-23.
213. See Kim Ode, Task Force Investigates Repressed Memory Issues, STAR TRIB.,
Oct. 11, 1993, at 03E. For more details, see American Psychological Association,
News, APA Panel Addresses Controversy Over Adult Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse, Nov. 11, 1994.
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unsuccessful Illinois example, and courts should either halt the use of
discovery exceptions or other legal theories in childhood sexual abuse
cases or at least dictate very strict standards on their application.
In childhood sexual abuse cases where clear, actual and vivid memo-
ries are present (Type I), the force of the law should descend upon the
perpetrators, sternly and firmly. However, in those cases based on recov-
ered memories (Type II), all parties should treat the issue not only sober-
ly but extremely cautiously. Above all, it is not only unwise, but also
unnecessary, to subvert the right to due process of law of many innocent
people in order to protect the few alleged victims of non-existing crimes.
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